Amnesia
The stream of
thought flows on; but most of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of
oblivion. . . . Selection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built.
And its utility is obvious. If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions
be as ill off as if we remembered nothing. (William James, The Princinles of
Psychology, 1S90)
We oftentimes
find a disease quite strips the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a
fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which
seemed to be as lasting as if graven in marble.
(John Locke,
Essay concerning Human Understanding, 1690)
In recent years,
the truth of these two maxims has been demonstrated in Luria's brilliant case
histories, which have illustrated the crippling consequences of an
extraordinarily absorptive and retentive memory (Luria, 1969), as well as the
devastating effects of a 'shattered' one (Luria, 1976). Memory plays a central
organising and selective role in our mental life. Moreover, its anomalies of
function were the starting point for psychoanalysis; its impairment is an early
and common sign of organic dysfunction; and its disruption in dementia is one
of the most prevalent and distressing of psychological disabilities. For these
various reasons, the study of memory and amnesia should be of immense interest
to the general psychiatrist.
Regrettably,
progress in this topic has sometimes been impeded by the narrow perspectives of
particular disciplines, and by their conflicting uses of terminology. Because
of this, the present review will begin with a brief outline of the terminology
to be employed here; and it will then consider the topic in four sections:
(I) clinical aspects of organic amnesia
(2) the nature of the deficits in organic
amnesia
(3) the neuropathology of amnesia
(4) psychogenic amnesia.
Experimental
psychologists distinguish between a primary
(or short-term) memory of very
limited capacity, which holds information for a few seconds only, and a secondary (or long-term) memory of much greater capacity and durability. Secondary memory, therefore, encompasses
all material recalled beyond a period of a few seconds, and items within it may
have occurred within the remote or recent past. Remote and recent memory tend
to be very loosely defined, but generally refer to the relative age of particular memories; whereas retrograde and post-traumatic amnesia are precisely defined in terms of the onset of an injury or illness. Retrograde amnesia (RA) refers to memory
loss for events occurring before the onset of a lesion, whilst post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) refers to
memory loss for events following this, and, with respect to head trauma, it
ends with the return of the continuous registration of 'personal' memories. Anterograde amnesia (AA) refers to
impairment in learning new material; it is commonly used synonymously with PTA,
although, in traumatic cases, such impairment may persist long after the
termination of PTA.
There have been
various attempts to investigate the subcomponents of primary and secondary
memory. Working memory refers to a
particular model of primary memory, distinguishing its sub-components and
emphasising its information-processing activity. Secondary memory has been
considered in terms of episodic (personal)
memory and semantic (conceptual)
memory, or, alternatively, in terms of conscious
recollection and memory for skills (procedural
memory): these will be discussed below. Traditionally, primary and secondary
memory were thought of as separate stores
operating in series: nowadays, greater emphasis is placed upon the processes they entail, and some
authorities argue that they operate in parallel rather than in series.
The present paper
will use the term psychogenic amnesia to
refer to all instances in which memory loss is presumed to have a
psychological, rather than an organic, basis. This term allows for the facts
that (i) both organic and psychogenic
amnesia involve disordered 'function', and that (ii) some combination of conscious
and unconscious ('hysterical')
factors may precipitate a psychologically based amnesta.
The following two
cases illustrate the way that some of these concepts will be used in the
present paper.
A.B. is a
62-year-old Korsakoff patient whose Wernicke encephalopathy occurred in 1970,
after many years of heavy drinking. He performs at a normal or near-normal
level at tests of primary memory, such as digit span. He can find his way about
the hospital (procedural memory), although he is unable to describe
('recollect') his route and he soon gets lost if he leaves the immediate
vicinity. He shows severe impairment at tests of secondary memory which require
him to learn new material (AA). He recalls virtually nothing about recent
events, either in his personal experience (episodic memory) or requiring
conceptual knowledge, such as the name of the present Prime Minister (semantic
memory). He also performs very poorly on a remote memory test, which asks about
news events from the late 1930s to the early 1980s - although there is relative
sparing of memories preceding the mid1950s. Obviously, both RA in (pre-1970)
and AA (post1970) have contributed to this man's remote memory impairment.
By contrast, C.D.
is a 24-year-old man who suffered a moderately severe concussion injury in a
road traffic accident. He developed an RA of 10-15 minutes and a PTA of 24
hours. During the period of his PTA, his performance at tests of primary memory
was impaired, but this recovered soon afterward. When reassessed some weeks
after his accident, his recall of recent and remote events appeared completely
intact except that his RA and PTA remained unchanged, i.e. there was a discrete
gap in his episodic memory. He also showed a mild impairment on formal learning
tests (AA).
The amnesic
states seen in clinical practice can be classified along two dimensions -
orgarric vs psychogenic, and
discrete (time-limited) episodes vs persistent
memory impairment. Table I provides examples of amnesic disorders falling
within the four quadrants of this classification. Obviously, there is some
overspill between the quadrants: for example, head injury and hypoglycaemia
often give rise to discrete amnesic 'gaps', but sometimes they may produce more
persistent memory impairment as well. The clinical characteristics of selected
examples of organic amnesia will be briefly discussed in the present section.
TABLE 1
Amnesic states
Discrete
episode Persistent
impairment
Organic
Toxic confusional state Drug toxicity
Head injury Amnesic
syndrome,
Epilepsy specific
Alcoholic 'black-out' Dementia,
Hypoglycaemia global
Transient global
amnesia
Post-ECT
Psychogenic
Fugue states Pseudodementia
Situation-specific
e.g. for an offence
Lishman (1987)
has described in detail the clinical assessment and investigation of organic
amnesia. Some clinical tests of memory, e.g. the use of a memory and
orientation scale and recall of a passage of prose, appear to be more
discriminating than others (Kopelman, 1986"'); and formal neuropsychological
assessment is usually essential.
Read injury is
the classical instance of a discrete, organic amnesia. The familiar pattern of
memory loss consists of a brief period of retrograde amnesia (RA), a longer
period of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA), and islets of preserved memory within
the amnesic gap (Russell & Nathan, 1946). Occasionally, PTA may occur
without any RA, although this is more common in cases of penetrating lesions.
Sometimes, there is a particularly vivid memory for images or sounds occurring
immediately before the injury, on regaining consciousness, or during a 'lucid'
interval between the injury and the onset of PTA.
As is well known,
the duration of PTA is assumed to reflect the degree of underlying diffuse
brain pathology. It is predictive of eventual cognitive outcome (Brooks,1984),
psychiatric outcome (Lishman, 1968), and social outcome (Russell & Smith,
1%]), although these relationships are weaker than is often assumed. There
appears to be a relationship with age such that older subjects tend to have a
longer PTA and more serious deficits at a given PTA (Russell & Smith,
1961), whereas in subjects under 30 PTA is sometimes found to be less effective
as a predictor of subsequent memory impairment (Brooks, 1972).
Following a mild
head injury, a neurotic ('post-traumatic') syndrome sometimes ensues in which
'forgetfulness' is a prominent complaint. The aetiology of this syndrome
remains controversial, but it is clear that the symptoms often persist long
after the settlement of any compensation issues. In more severe head injury,
the ability to learn new material is the slowest cognitive deficit to recover,
and the pattern of residual memory deficit resembles, in many respects, that
seen in the Korsakoff or 'amnesic' syndrome (Brooks, 1984; Baddeley et al, 1987; Merskey & Woodforde,
1972).
Goodwin et al (1969) described discrete episodes
of memory loss for significant events' which occurred in 64 % of a sample of
100 hospitalised alc6holics. These 'black-outs' were always associated with
prolonged alcohol abuse and severe intoxication, and were of two types. In the
'fragmentary' type, the subject became aware of his memory loss only after
being told about an event later: there were 'islets' of preserved memory, and
the amnesia tended to shrink through time in a manner analogous to the RA of a
head injury. In the 'en bloc' variety, the subject usually became aware of the
memory loss on awakening from sleep with a sense of 'lost time': the amnesic
gap had a definite starting point, islets of preserved memory were rare, and
the memories were very seldom recovered. In a minority of cases, the subjects
'came round' while alert and awake, realising that they had no recollection of
what they had been doing: sometimes they had travelled, paid cheques, stayed in
hotels, in a similar manner to a 'fugue state'. Three subjects reported 'en
bloc' blackouts lasting between 2 and 5 days. In addition, 'state-dependent'
phenomena were reported by 61 % of the patients who had black-outs: commonly,
the subjects would hide money when drunk, be unable to find it when sober, and
would retrieve it again when intoxicated. The authors cited a 47-year-old woman
who wrote letters when drinking, was unable to decipher them when sober, and
would resume writing as soon as she had had a few drinks: "It was like
picking up the pencil where I had left off."
The diagnosis of
an alcoholic black-out can be important in medico-legal cases in which a
defendent may claim amnesia for his offence, as will be discussed below.
This is an
iatrogenic form of 'discrete' amnesia, and the adverse effects of ECT on the
recall of personal memories were noted from an early stage (e.g. Janis &
Astrachan, 1951). In recent years, the pattern of the memory deficit has been
carefully mapped out. Verbal memory appears to be particularly sensitive to
disruption, and unilateral ECT to the non-dominant hemisphere produces
considerably less memory impairment than bilateral ECT (Squire, 1977), making
it important to identify the non-dominant hemisphere by a valid procedure
(Kopelman, 1982). Squire and his colleagues have found that subjects tested
within a few hours of ECT show a retrograde impairment for information from the
preceding 1-3 years, a pronounced anterograde deficit on recall and recognition
tests, and accelerated forgetting of newly learned information (Squire, 1977,
1981; Squire et al, 1984). Although
these deficits have been attributed by some to cholinergic depletion, they are
more widespread than would be expected on such a basis, and would seem more
likely to be attributable to gross metabolic disruption.
Follow-up
studies, 6-9 months after ECT, reveal that memory performance on objective
tests returns to normal, apart from a persistent loss of material acquired
within a few hours of the convulsions (Squire, 1977; Freeman et al, 1980; Squire & Slater, 1983;
Frith et al 1983). However,
complaints of memory impairment persist (Squire, 1977; Freeman et al, 1980; Frith et al, 1983), and are still evident after 3 years (Squire &
Slater, 1983). Squire & Slater (1983) found that the complaints focus upon
the period for which there has been an initial, authentic (retrograde and
anterograde) amnesia. Freeman et at (1980)
reported that the subjects who complain most do, in fact, perform poorer on
objective tests than those who do not complain, but Squire & Slater (1983),
using similar tests, did not find this. Squire & Slater (1983) and Frith et at (1983) both indicate that the
'complainers' are the patients who have recovered least well from their
depression.
The Korsakoff
syndrome is the classical example of a 'persistent' organic amnesia. It is best
defined as "an abnormal mental state in which memory and learning are
affected out of all proportion to other cognitive functions in an otherwise
alert and responsive patient" (Victor et
at, 1971).
Lawson (1879) and
Korsakoff (1889) both described profound amnesia occurring as a consequence of
extensive alcohol abuse, but they also recognised that other factors could
produce an identical syndrome. Although Korsakoff indicated that recent
memories tend to be more severely affected than remote, he emphasised that the
retrograde component to the amnesia is very variable and sometimes extends back
many years or decades.
Subsequent
clinical and experimental studies have confirmed the extensiveness of the
remote memory impairment, but tend to find that there is indeed a relative
sparing of the most distant memories, whether tested in terms of the
recognition or recall of famous faces and news events, or the recall of
personal memories (Butters & Albert, 1982; Squire et at, 1984; Baddeley & Wilson, 1986).
Korsakoff (1889)
also drew attention to the patients' disorientation in time and their inability
to recall the temporal sequence of events. The disorientation in time can
result in an under-estimation of the time spent in hospital (Moll, 1916) and of
the patient's own age (Zangwill, 1953), rather similar to that described in some
schizophrenic patients. The failure to recall the temporal context of events
may contribute to confabulation, which often involves the inappropriate and
jumbled recall of genuine events, rather than the fabrication of fictions
(Korsakoff, 1889; Victor et at, 1971).
"Telling of a trip she had made to Finland before her illness.. . [the
patient] mixed into her story her recollections of the Crimea, and so it turned
out that in Finland people always eat lamb and the inhabitants are Tatars"
(Korsakoff, 1889).
It is commonly
stated that both Wernicke and Korsakoff failed to recognise the relationship of
their two syndromes (e.g. Victor et at, 1971).
However, Korsakoff (1889) did in fact notice confusion, ataxia, nystagmus, and
opthalmoplegia in some of his patients. Describing patients seen in an acute
neurological service, Victor et at (1971)
reported that Wernicke signs preceded the amnesia in 96% of Korsakoff cases;
whereas the recorded prevalence in psychiatric series tends to be rather lower.
Moll (1916) suggested that the disorder can have either an acute or an
insidious onset; and recent studies have confirmed that the initial clinical
manifestations of the disorder may range from acute coma (Torvik et at, 1982), through the classical
acute Wernicke syndrome, to an insidious onset (Cutting, 1978a). Moreover, the
characteristic neuropathology is identified in many cases at autopsy who have
survived in the community without being diagnosed in life (Harper, 1983; Torvik
et at, 1982). This latter finding provides
some support for those who believe that the clinical Korsakoff syndrome may
represent an extreme form of the memory impairment commonly found in
non-Korsakoff alcoholics (e.g. Butters & Albert, 1982).
Memory impairment
is a prominent early symptom in dementing patients, but, unlike the above disorders,
it takes place in the context of widespread cortical atrophy and multiple
cognitive deficits. Morris and Kopelman (1986) have suggested that the pattern
of memory impairment in Alzheimertype dementia can be viewed as the outcome of
'information-processing' deficits superimposed upon an amnesic syndrome; and
there is evidence that this pattern may differ from that seen in normal aging
(Huppert & Kopelman, 1987).
There is a profound
impairment in learning new information but, surprisingly, the forgetting rate
of 'acquired' information is normal in early cases, once adequate learning has
been accomplished, a pattern which is consistent with that expected on the
basis of cholinergic depletion (Kopelman, 1985a). There is also an extensive
impairment of remote memory, although, to date, objective tests have failed to
establish evidence of any relative sparing of the most distant memories (Wilson
et at, 1981). Superimposed on this pattern
is a substantial impairment at tests of primary memory, e.g. digit span
(Miller, 1973; Kopelman, 1985a); and
there may also be impairment in certain aspects of semantic memory, requiring
knowledge of facts or concepts (Weingartner et
al, 1983). Furthermore, the impact of these various memory deficits upon
the patients' daily lives is likely to be potentiated by an interaction with
the effect of their other cognitive defects. For example, the impairment of
primary memory is most severe in younger patients, who have the most advanced
neuropathology, and this deficit may exacerbate the effect of any subtle
dysphasic difficulty (Kopelman, 1986b). Similarly, as discussed below, the
combination of amnesia and severe frontal dysfunction may precipitate very florid
confabulation in some cases.
Clinical trials
of cholinergic 'replacement' therapy to alleviate the memory disorder in
dementia have tended to be a little more successful than trials of other
pharmacological agents, although all are disappointing. These studies have been
reviewed in detail elsewhere (Hollander et
a', 1986; Kopelman & Lishman, 1986; Kopelman, 1986c).
Berlyne (1972)
distinguished between 'momentary' confabulation, which is fleeting and has to
be provoked, and 'fantastic' confabulation which is sustained, wide-ranging,
grandiose, and spontaneous. These might better be termed 'provoked' and
'spontaneous' confabulation as the former is seen only in response to questions
probing the subject's memory, whereas the latter is readily evident in his or
her everyday conversation.
Provoked
confabulation is common in amnesic patients when given memory tests and may
represent a normal response to a faulty memory; it may be related to the
distortions and intrusions commonly produced by healthy subjects when they
remember something poorly (Bartlett, 1932). In a series of 16 Alzheimer and 16
Korsakoff patients described elsewhere (Kopelman, 1985a,b), the present author obtained instances of provoked
confabulation in seven Alzheimer and eight Korsakoff cases, usually in the
immediate or delayed (45 minutes) recall of a prose passage. Moreover, when 17
healthy subjects were asked to recall this passage after a 1-week delay, eight
subjects showed similar distortions or confabulations, e.g. in recalling a
woman whose purse had been stolen in a high street, it was said that she was a
thief who was stopped by the police, or that the episode took place near a
railway station.
Spontaneous
confabulation, on the other hand, is a pathological phenomenon, which may
result from the superimposition of frontal lobe pathology on an organic
amnesia. This suggestion was first made by Luria in 1976, and, subsequently, a
number of other researchers have identified an association between
confabulation and the presence of either frontal lobe pathology or evidence of
frontal dysfunction (Stuss et al, 1978;
Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Baddeley & Wilson, 1986). According to Luria
(1976), this kind of confabulation may sometimes involve the inappropriate
recall of real memories, jumbled in temporal sequence (cf. Korsakoff, 1889;
Victor et al, 1971), whereas Berlyne
(1972) emphasised the fabrication of fictions: it seems likely that the latter
can be grafted on to the former. Several authors have noted that the confabulations
can be preoccupying, bizarre, and held with firm conviction, in which case they
may be distinguishable from delusional memories only in that they occur in the
context of an organic amnesia rather than a psychosis. Possibly because of the
association with fairly severe frontal lobe pathology, spontaneous
confabulation appears to be much commoner in the more advanced stages of
Alzheimer's disease than in the chronic phase of Korsakoff's syndrome. In
Berlyne's (1972) series, it occurred in eight out of 62 dementing patients, but
in only one Korsakoff patient who was described as having had a frontal lobe
syndrome following a head injury. In the present author's series, it was seen
in only two cases, both of whom were Alzheimer patients.
Kapur and Coughian
(1 980) described a 48-year old building contractor who had an (antenor
communicating) aneurysm clipped following a subarachnoid haemorrhage. CT scan
showed a well-defined area of left frontal hypodensity. An initial right-sided
weakness recovered rapidly, but he was left with a pronounced personality
change including irritability, apathy, and sexual disinhibition. Performance at
delayed recall and 'frontal' tests was poor, but he did surprisingly well at
recognition tests. Confabulation was prominent and spontaneous: "He would
claim . . . in the morning to have fictitious business appointments when in
fact he was attending a day centre, would frequently dress for dinner in the
evening in the mistaken belief that guests were coming . . . When questioned about
holidays or outings over the past few days, he would again report events that
bore no relation to actual happenings. When the correct version of events was
brought to his attention, he would either seem puzzled . . or place the confabulated event in another
temporal context".
Neuropsychologists
have devoted considerable attention to trying to identify the nature of the
memory deficits in organic amnesia. With regard to anterograde amnesia, many
theories have been propounded but they can be broadly classified under four
main headings, corresponding to the stage or aspect of memory processes
considered impaired. Some theories postulate deficits in the 'acquisition'
processes occurring during and shortly after the initial 'registration' of
information, whereas others propose impairments in subsequent 'retention' or
'retrieval'.
These theories
propose that there is a deficit in the psychological processes involved in the
initial 'registration' of information. In particular, it has been suggested
that, whilst amnesic patients are able to 'encode' the direct, sensory
properties of information, they have difficulty in 'processing' its more
meaningful (semantic) qualities. For example, Korsakoff patients perform
particularly badly at learning word pairs (e.g. hungry-thin) whose recall is
normally facilitated by thinking of semantic links between the words (Cutting,
1978b). On the other hand, this does not seem to be true of all cases (Squire,
1982), and giving instructions or orienting tasks which encourage the
extraction of meaning from a stimulus produces, at most, a relatively small
enhancement in the amnesic patients' subsequent recall of that stimulus
(Meudell et al, 1979; McDowall,
1981). It seems unlikely that a failure to encode semantic information is the
fundamental deficit in amnesia, although it remains plausible that there exists
some impairment in initial 'encoding' which is at present poorly defined and
measured.
A second type of
hypothesis proposes that there is impairment in the physiological processes
which are assumed to occur shortly after initial registration and to establish
('consolidate') information in memory into some relatively permanent form (e.g.
Meudell et al, 1979; Moscovitch,
1982). These processes were traditionally thought to involve the 'transfer' of
information from primary to secondary memory, operating during a time-period of
something less than a minute. The hypothesis was suggested by the finding that
primary memory (holding information for a few seconds) is relatively intact, in
the presence of profound amnesia, in patients with hippocampal lesions, head
injury, and in some studies of Korsakoff patients (e.g. Mimer, 1966; Brooks,
1984; Kopelman, 1985b). In one
particularly intriguing study, Lynch and Yarnell (1973) interviewed six
concussed
American
footballers within 30 seconds of their injury and at intervals thereafter.
Although they were initially able to give a lucid account of events occurring
just before the blow, they subsequently developed a 'relatively complete'
retrograde amnesia.
An attraction of
consolidation theory is that the properties and time-course of action of the
cholinergic neurotransmitter system might appear to make it an excellent
'candidate' as the physiological substrate of the process (see Kopelman, 1985a,
1986"'). A problem is that such a rapid consolidation process cannot
explain why a retrograde amnesia of more than a few seconds can occur; and
Squire et al (1984) have recently
postulated 'consolidation' lasting as long as two years to try to account for
this difficulty (see below).
A third
possibility focuses attention upon 'storage' (retention) rather than learning
processes. In recent years, it has been suggested that patients who have
hippocampal lesions show faster forgetting, even after material has been
adequately learned (Huppert & Piercy, 1979; Squire, 1981). In one version
of this theory, the accelerated forgetting appears to be viewed as being
superimposed upon (and arising independently of) any 'acquisition' deficit
(Huppert & Piercy, 1979); whereas, in another version, it is seen as a
consequence of a faulty (and protracted) consolidation process (Squire et a!, 1984).
There is some
evidence that normal aging causes a slight increase in the forgetting rate of
visuospatial information (Huppert & Kopelman, 1987), and that the gross
metabolic disruption following ECT produces accelerated forgetting (Squire,
1981). However, there is surprisingly little evidence that structural lesions
produce accelerated forgetting. Patients who have the Korsakoff syndrome, penetrating
and non-penetrating head injury, and Alzheimer-type dementia have all been
shown to exhibit a normal forgetting rate (relative to age-matched controls),
once efforts have been taken to ensure that adequate initial learning has taken
place (Huppert & Piercy, 1978; Squire, 1981; Kopelman, 1985b; Baddeley et a!, 1987). It seems that the clinical
impression of faster forgetting in such patients arises because information has
never been adequately absorbed at initial input.
Two types of
retrieval hypothesis have been postulated. 'Pure' retrieval hypotheses
postulate a retrieval deficit arising independently of any failure in
'acquisition' processes. For example, Warrington & Weiskrantz (1973)
postulated that amnesic patients are unable to suppress inappropriate responses
during recall or recognition tasks. They noted that amnesic patients sometimes
respond erroneously to memory tests with what had been the correct replies to
previous tests (even if these had not been recalled at the appropriate time);
and, secondly, that the provision of retrieval cues (e.g. initial letters of
words to be recalled) can improve their performance. On the other hand, it has
been shown that healthy subjects also exhibit these phenomena when given recall
tests at relatively long retention intervals (e.g. a week) - suggesting that
they may be a consequence of poor memory, rather than its cause (e.g. Woods
& Piercy, 1974). Moreover, restricting the number of choices in a
recognition or cued recall test does not necessarily improve amnesics'
performance, relative to controls, in the way that this hypothesis predicts
that it should (Huppert & Piercy, 1976; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1978).
A modified
retrieval hypothesis stresses evidence that retrieval processes are dependent
upon the nature of initial encoding, in terms of a network of cognitive and
affective associations, and it suggests that retrieval deficits arise in
consequence of initial encoding deficits. However, when couched in these terms,
the distinction between an encoding and retrieval deficit becomes essentially
linguistic (Squire, 1980).
Retrograde amnesia
In summary, the
evidence reviewed above would seem to suggest that the deficit in anterograde
amnesia occurs at the stage of memory 'acquisition,' although the precise
nature of this fault, in terms of (psychological) encoding or (physiological)
consolidation, remains to be specified. Accelerated forgetting does not seem
to occur in cases of structural lesions, and any retrieval deficits appear to
take place as a consequence of the initial 'acquisition' deficit.
Such an
explanation fails to account for retrograde amnesia and for its temporal
gradient, with relative sparing of more remote memories in, for example, the
Korsakoff syndrome. However, various clinical studies have suggested that
retrograde and anterograde amnesia may occur, and show improvement or
deterioration, independently of each other (e.g. Goldberg et al, 1982; Kapur et al, 1986).
Differing anatomical substrates for the two aspects of amnesia have been
postulated, but there is very little agreement on which site produces
retrograde amnesia.
At a psychological
level, several factors have been implicated. Squire et al (1984) cited the occurrence of a relatively short (1-2 years)
retrograde impairment in some head injury cases, post-ECT confusional states,
and a bitemporal lobectomy patient, as evidence for disruption of a prolonged
'consolidation' process. Much more commonly, the length of retrograde amnesia
in head injury is a few seconds or minutes only (Russeli & Smith, 1961),
and it certainly seems very plausible that such a short RA might result from a
disrupted physiological process, such as 'consolidation'. However, the more
extensive remote memory impairment in Korsakoff and Alzheimer cases requires a
different explanation.
Butters &
Albert (1982) demonstrated a loss of recent memories in chronic alcoholics,
which they attributed to a progressive anterograde impairment during the period
of heavy drinking. Korsakoff patients perform substantially worse than other
alcoholics at remote memory tests, and Butters & Albert suggested that,
superimposed on the alcoholics' loss of recent memories, Korsakoff patients
exhibit a 'generalised' retrograde impairment, which has an abrupt onset at the
time of the Wernicke encephalopathy. Alzheimer patients may manifest a
similarly generalised retrograde loss, in which a relative sparing of the most
remote memories may be more apparent than real (Wilson et al, 1981). It has been suggested that this generalised,
retrograde loss consists of a 'general impairment in reconstructing past
memories' (Squire et al, 1984); and,
in this connection, it may be relevant that various authors have emphasised the
role of contextual cues (e.g. time, order, place) in the 'reconstruction'
(conjuring up) of past memories (e.g. Baddeley, 1982).
Memory for context
There is now
evidence that Korsakoff patients and some (but not all) other amnesic patients
have particular difficulty in recalling the context of information (Huppert
& Piercy, 1976; Mayes et al, 1985).
In studies of anterograde amnesia, they show a disproportionate difficulty in recalling
the temporal sequence of events, the place where something was learned (spatial
context), and the source of information even when the information itself has
been recalled. In studies of retrograde amnesia, they exhibit problems in
dating or ordering events.
There are
problems of method in most of these studies, but evidence is accumulating that
it is the presence of concomitant frontal lobe pathology in amnesia which may
underlie the failure to recall the context of information (Squire, 1982; Mayes et al, 1985). Since some degree of
frontal dysfunction is common in Korsakoff and Alzheimer patients, it seems
reasonable to suppose that this failure to recall contextual information may
contribute to their difficulty in retrieving from remote memory - a hypothesis
currently being tested by the author. As mentioned above, frontal dysfunction
and impaired recall of temporal context have also been implicated as factors
producing 'spontaneous' confabulation: it seems plausible that spontaneous
confabulation may reflect more extensive frontal lobe pathology, resulting in
the extremely incoherent (context-free) retrieval of past memories and
associations.
Memory without
awareness
Whatever the
fundamental deficit in organic amnesia, certain aspects of memory do appear to be relatively preserved in
amnesia, and these appear to be those components which do not require conscious
recollection of personal experiences. In the nineteenth century, James Mill,
Henry Maudsley and William James had all emphasised that an essential component
of memory is the "additional conscious-ness that we have thought or
experienced (something) before" (James, 1890). However, at the turn of the
century, Claparede (1911) demonstrated that "the feeling that (a memory) belongs
to the person's experience can be absent in situations in which retention is
evident". He cited a Korsakoff patient whose finger he pricked with a pin,
and who avoided shaking Claparede's extended hand the next day without knowing
why. This lady was able to learn her way around the hospital, e.g. to the
bathroom, but was completely unable to describe her route.
Modern
experiments have confirmed that severely amnesic subjects can show normal
conditioning (Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1979), and can acquire and retain
affective reactions despite their profound impairment of 'conscious
recollection' (Johnson et al, 1985). They
can also acquire and show retention in certain skills, e.g. performing jigsaw
puzzles or reading back-to-front writing, in the absence of any recall or
recognition of having performed the tasks before. In a particularly striking
example, Starr & Phillips (1970) described a pianist who was taught a new
piece of music but the next day had no recall of it,. on being hummed the first
few bars, he was able to continue playing the piece, although still unable to
recall the name of the piece or that he had been taught it before. Such skill
(or 'procedural') learning does not necessarily appear to depend upon
well-established premorbid learning, and most researchers postulate that it
depends upon a subsystem of memory independent of that which subserves
'conscious recollection' (Moscovitch, 1982; Squire et a!, 1984).
Probably related
is the 'priming' phenomenon, in which a learning episode has a transient, facilitative
effect on the performance of a subsequent task. For example, viewing a series
of words during a study session makes it especially likely that amnesic
subjects will give those words in response to some subsequent test, even though
their performance at a recognition test of those words may be severely
impaired. Shimamura & Squire (1984) propose that priming involves the
activation of 'pre-existing elements or processing structures', which, in turn,
may be necessary for skill learning to develop.
A further
suggestion, put forward in different ways by Gillespie (1937) and Tulving
(1972), is that semantic memory' is selectively spared in organic amnesia, i.e.
memory for facts, concepts, and language (as opposed to memory for personal
experiences or events). Unfortunately, the status of semantic memory as an
independent memory subsystem remains equivocal, because the tests used to
examine it have usually required the recall of material which has been
'over-learned' premorbidly. Moreover, the concept of 'semantic memory' is
itself something of a conglomerate, in that the memory system which subserves
our use of language (commonly spared in amnesia) may well differ from that
which enables us to name the present or past Prime Minister
(characteristically affected in amnesia).
Table II lists
the principal types of pathology which give rise to an amnesic syndrome.
Consideration of these pathologies has led many authorities to postulate that
two types of lesion are particularly likely to disrupt the formation of new
memories: bilateral hippocampal lesions and diencephalic lesions.
TABLE II
Aetiology of the amnesic syndrome
Thiamine
deficiency
- alcohol
- malnutrition
- malabsorption
Head injury
Post-encephalitis -e.g. herpes simplex
Anoxia -e.g. CO poisoning
Vascular lesions
-e.g. thalamic infarction
- subarachnoid haemorrhage
Tumour (third
Ventricle)
TB meningitis
(Bilateral)
temporal lobectomy
Scoville & Mimer (1957) reported
moderate or severe amnesia in eight patients who had undergone bilateral temporal lobectomy for management
of psychosis or epilepsy, the amnesia
being most severe in three cases in whom the removal of the hippocampi was most
extensive. No amnesia was seen in a case who had a unilateral operation
only, nor in a case in whom the hippocampi were spared. One of the most severe
cases (H.M.) has been described in detail (e.g. Mimer, 1966). He had a
retrograde component to his amnesia extending back 2 or 3 years before his
operation, and a profound anterograde amnesia. More than a decade after his
operation, he was unable to find his way to the home in which he had lived for
several years; he performed the same crossword puzzle repetitively without
showing practice effects; and he mourned afresh every time he learned that his
uncle had died. However, his immediate memory span, his IQ, and his ability to
hold conversation were all normal (Mimer, 1966). Patients who have suffered a
herpes simplex encephalitis sometimes manifest a similarly severe amnesia, and
the neuropathology typically involves a profound necrosis of bilateral, medial
temporal structures as well as some involvement of the orbitofrontal regions
(Hierons et al, 1978). The hippocampi
and the temporal lobes are, of course, particularly implicated in the
neuropathology of Alzheimer's disease (Tomlinson & Corsellis, 1984); and
the temporal poles are especially vulnerable to bilateral contusions in head
injury (Teasdale & Mendelow, 1984).
Diencephalic
involvement was first implicated from autopsy studies of Korsakoff cases.
Malamud & Skillicorn (1956) and Victor et
al (1971) noted that the pathology occurred in the paraventricular and
peri-aqueductal grey matter, particularly in the mammillary bodies and
medial-dorsal nucleus of the thalamus. Victor et al (1971) pointed out that all 24 of their cases, in whom the
medial-dorsal nucleus of the thalamus was implicated, had a history of memory
impairment (Korsakoff syndrome), whereas five cases in whom it was not affected
had a history of Wernicke features only. By contrast, the mammillary bodies
were implicated in all the Wernicke and Korsakoff cases examined. Amnesia in
association with unilateral or bilateral involvement of the thalamic nuclei,
with apparent sparing of the
mamillary bodies, has been described in cases of tumour, trauma, and infarction
(McEntee eta', 1976; Squire &
Moore, 1979; Speedie & Heilman, 1982). However, Mair et al (1979) have described two amnesic cases whose autopsies
showed lesions in the mammillary bodies and the midline of the thalamus, but not in the medial dorsal nuclei. Mair et al suggested that the lesions they
described might 'disconnect' a critical circuit running between the temporal
lobes and the frontal cortex.
A potential
difficulty for the view that the diencephalon and hippocampi are critical in
memory formation is that lesions of the fornix bundle, which transmits
connecting fibres between them, do not always seem to produce amnesia in
animals and man. However, the more recent animal studies suggest deficits
consistent with those seen in human amnesia:
namely, a
relative sparing of primary memory and the learning of affective associations,
together with a profound impairment of secondary memory as measured on
recognition tests (Owen & Butler, 1981; Carr, 1982). A more serious
problem, documented by Markowitsch (1984), is that lesions within the
hippocampi and thalamic nuclei themselves do not always give rise to amnesia
and, when they do, there is usually concomitant involvement of other nuclei.
Whilst acknowledging that there may be 'nodal points' in the neural substrate
of memory, Markowitsch argues that the thalamic nuclei and hippocampi do not
represent discrete 'functional entities', but are embedded in complex neural
circuits and 'neuronal assemblies'. Similarly, Mishkin (1978) has argued that combined lesions within the hippocampal
(medial limbic) and amygdaloid (basolateral limbic) circuits are required to
produce severe amnesia; and it seems plausible to suppose that neurotransmitter
depletion within these circuits, which contain cholinergic pathways, may be
critical in producing amnesia. The dorsomedial thalamus and medial temporal
lobes are the anatomical locations ('nodal points') where these two circuits
converge, and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to the effect of
discrete, structural lesions (Speedie & Heilman, 1982).
Recent attention
has focused upon the neurochemistry of amnesia. In the Korsakoff syndrome, the
role of thiamine deficiency was confirmed by the De Wardener & Lennox
(1947) study of prisoners of war in South East Asia; and, more recently, Blass
& Gibson (1977) have postulated a hereditary abnormality of transketolase
metabolism which predisposes some alcoholics to this disorder. However, this
latter study was based on only four cases, and other studies indicate wide
variability in transketolase activity amongst Korsakoff and other alcoholics
(Leigh et al, 1981).
In Alzheimer's
disease, three sources of evidence suggest that cholinergic depletion
contributes to the memory disorder:
(a) neuropathological studies demonstrating
reduction in cholinergic enzymes and synthesis
(b) pharmacological studies examining the
effect of cholinergic 'blockade' in healthy subjects
(c) clinical trials administering
cholinergic agents to Alzheimer patients.
These studies
have been reviewed in detail elsewhere (Kopelman, 1986"'), and it seems
likely that cholinergic depletion accounts for some, but not all, of the memory
deficits seen in Alzheimer-type dementia. A small study has suggested that
there may also be depletion of cholinergic neurons in Korsakoff's syndrome
(Arendt ci al, 1983), and the pattern
of the anterograde memory deficit in this disorder would indeed be consistent
with such an observation: however, there is insufficient neuropathological
evidence to place any great weight on this hypothesis as yet.
The role of other
neurotransmitter systems in memory and dementia remains to be elucidated. An
impairment of the ascending noradrenergic pathways in Korsakoff's syndrome has
been implicated by McEntee et al (1984),
but their results have not been replicated (Martin et a!, 1984). Moreover, animal studies implicate the adrenergic
system in mechanisms mediating attention and arousal, and trials of
vasopressin, which modulates adrenergic activity, indicate an effect on arousal
and mood rather than memory (Kopelman & Lishman, 1986).
The phenomenology
of psychogenic amnesia often bears interesting resemblances to organic amnesia.
For example, there may be islets or fragments of preserved memory within the
amnesic gap. A woman, who was due to meet her husband to discuss divorce,
recalled that she was 'supposed to meet someone' (Kanzer, 1939). A young man,
who slipped into a fugue following his grandfather's funeral, recalled a
cluster of details from the year (1979) which he described (after recovery) as
having been the happiest of his life (Schachter et a!, 1982). The subject may adopt a detached attitude to these
memory fragments, describing them as 'strange and unfamiliar' (Coriat, 1907).
In many cases, semantic knowledge remains Intact, e.g. foreign languages and
the names of streets, towns, and famous people (Kanzer, 1939; Schachter et a!, 1982), whereas in others it is
also implicated (Coriat, 1907; Abeles & Schilder, 1935; Kanzer, 1939).
Similarly, performance at verbal learning tests has been reported as unaffected
(Abeles & Schilder, 1935), mildly impaired (Schachter ci a!, 1982), or more severely impaired
(Gudjonsson & Taylor, 1985). Memory for skills is often preserved (e.g.
Coriat, 1907), but in the Padola case (Bradford & Smith, 1979) retention of
a rudimentary knowledge of aerodynamics and of other skills (e.g. solving jigsaw
puzzles) was taken as evidence against an organic amnesia - an interpretation
in conflict with the recent findings regarding the relative preservation of
'procedural' memory, reviewed above. Sometimes, memory retrieval may be
facilitated by chance cues in the environment (e.g. Abeles & Schilder,
1935; Schachter ci a!, 1982) but
deliberate cueing is often unsuccessful (Coriat, 1907; Kanzer, 1939), and the
results of amytal abreaction are very variable.
Table I includes
psychologically based amnesias, giving fugue states and situation-specific
memory loss as examples of 'discrete' amnesias, and depressive pseudodementia
as a more persistent impairment. In both discrete and persistent amnesia, the
differentiation of psychogenic from organic causation can be surprisingly
difficult. In the discrete type, the diagnosis usually relies on such features
as the rate and circumstances of the onset, loss of personal identity (rare in
organic amnesia except in advanced dementia), and whether new learning is
affected (often spared in psychogenic amnesia, although not necessarily so). In
the persistent type, the past and family history, the results of physical
investigations, the current pattern of deficit, and the patient's response to
it, all provide important clues, but the diagnostic problem can remain
perplexing.
Fugue states
'Fugue states'
refer to a syndrome characterised by the abrupt onset of a loss of personal
('episodic') memory and of the sense of personal identity, associated with a
period of wandering. The episode usually resolves within a few hours or days,
after which the subject is left with a residual amnesic gap for the period of
the fugue. Fugue states are rare, but their study has helped to elucidate the
factors predisposing to psychogenic amnesia. These are listed in Table III.
TABLE Ill
Psychogenic amnesia:
factors predisposing to fugue states
1.
Precipitating
stress e.g.
-marital discord (Kanzer, 1939)
-financial problems (Kanzer, 1939)
-offending (Wilson ef
at, 1950)
-war stress (Sargant
& Slater, 1941; Parfitt & Gall, 1944)
2. Depressed mood (Kanzer, 1939; Stengel, 1941; Berrington et al, 1956)
3. Suicide attempts (Stengel, 1941; Berrington et al, 1956)
4. Past history of head injury (Abeles and Schilder, 1939; Berrington et
al, 1956)
5. Past history of alcohol abuse (Kanzer,
1939; Berrington et al, 1956)
6. Epilepsy (Stengel, 1941)
7. Other neurosis (Sargant & Slater, 1941)
8. Other organic disorder (Kennedy & Neville, 1957)
9. Tendency to lie (Stengel, 1941; Wilson et al, 1950; Berrington et al, 1956)
There is always a
severe precipitating stress, and fugues are reported much more commonly in wartime
(Sargant & Slater, 1941). However, they also occur following marital or
emotional discord or at times of financial difficulty. A history of depressed
mood just before the onset of the fugue is virtually always present, including
those cases in which there is some other, formal psychiatric diagnosis
(Berrington, 1956). Occasionally, the fugue may even represent a 'flight from
suicide' (Stengel, 1941). For example, Abeles & Schilder (1935) described a
woman who deserted her husband for another man: after a week she determined to
return to her family but, as she
descended the Underground stairway, she was contemplating suicide.
"Instead amnesia developed", the authors tersely reported. Stengel
(1941) claimed that suicide never occurs during a fugue, but may take place as
the subject emerges from the fugue. A past history of an organic amnesia is
also common, arising, for example, from a head injury, an alcoholic black-out,
or from epilepsy. Berrington et at (1956)
reported that 16 of their 37 cases had previously experienced a severe head
injury, and a further three cases head injury of uncertain severity. On the
other hand, epilepsy is reported less commonly than is generally supposed,
Stengel giving the highest figure (10%). In summary, it appears that some
subjects, who have experienced an earlier organic amnesia, are predisposed to
developing a psychogenic memory loss, in the presence of depressed mood and a
severe precipitating stress. On the other hand, several authors have remarked
that these patients tend to be rather unreliable personalities with either a
tendency to lie or a legal motive for wishing to have a fugue state
substantiated.
E.F. was a
46-year-old man who described 12 to 15 episodes of 'going blank' during the
previous 5 years. He said that these episodes lasted 2 to 36 hours, and that,
on 'coming round', his feet were often sure, he was a long way from home, and
he had no idea of the time or what had been happening during the previous
hours. For example, he found himself on one occasion near the Thames, 10 miles
from his home, with his clothes sopping wet. There was a history of epilepsy
since he was 19, ECT and bilateral leucotomy at 33, major cardiac surgery,
recurrent depression, and two serious suicide attempts. He had recently married
for the third time: his wife was many years younger than himself and was
pregnant. Marital difficulties were suspected, but were vehemently denied by
both partners. Mr E.F. asked for a psychiatric report after being charged with
driving whilst disqualified, without any insurance, and whilst under the
influence of alcohol: his defence was that he had been in a fugue state.
A common form of
psychogenic amnesia with important implications is that claimed for a criminal
offence. Most commonly, this has been described in association with homicide,
in which it is claimed in 30-40% of cases (Table IV). A study in Broadmoor
Hospital (Hopwood & Snell, 1933) and another in Brixton remand prison
(Taylor & Kopelman, 1984) showed that amnesia also occurs in other violent
crimes, although less commonly. In these studies, amnesia was found rarely or
not at all in non-violent crime: this may have reflected the locations of the
studies, but there is evidence that in violent crime recall by victims and
eyewitnesses is also impaired. Taylor & Kopelman (1984) found that amnesia
for an offence occurs in three types of circumstance:
(a) homicide cases in which the victim is
closely related to the offender (a lover, wife, or family member), and the
offence is unpremeditated and takes place in a state of high emotional arousal
(b) chronic alcohol abusers who commit a crime
when severely intoxicated and whose victims are much less commonly related to
them
(c) a small number of schizophrenic patients
who commit criminal damage when floridly psychotic.
TABLE IV
Homicide studies
No. % Amnesic
Leitch (1948) 51 31
Guttmacher (1955) 36 33
O'Connell (1960) 50 40
Bradford &
Smith (1979) 30 47
Taylor &
Kopelman (1984) 34 26
Parwatikar et at
(1985) 105 23
Pre-trial
evaluations only; rate for convicted homicides nor given.
G.H. was a
40-year-old man, who had been born in Egypt, and was Jewish by religion. He had
lived in England for 20 years, and was married to a 33-year-old Englishwoman.
There was a son aged 9 and a daughter aged 3. The wife was having an affair
with a musician, and G.H. was being treated for depression as an out-patient at
a teaching hospital. He was taking an antidepressant and a benzodiazepine. On
the day of the offence, the couple had a furious row during which G.H.
threatened to kill the musician. His wife shared a bedroom with her daughter,
and the last thing G.H. remembered was going to kiss the child goodnight. He
reported that he could not remember what happened after that until the police
arrived, but that he had been told that he phoned the police himself. He was
charged with the murder of his wife by stabbing.
A more
persistent, psychologically based memory impairment is that occurring in a
depressive pseudo-dementia, the clinical features of which have been described
elsewhere. Memory impairment appears to be common in depression, although in
the majority of cases it is relatively mild and poorly correlated with the
severity of the depression (e.g. Kopelman, 1986a). The nature of the impairment
in those cases which masquerade as 'dementia' is unclear, but one suggestion is
that the disorder involves the more 'effortful' aspects of memory processes,
and is closely associated with deficits in attention, motivation, and drive
(Cohen et al, 1982). Affective
disorder also gives rise to some particularly interesting state-dependent
phenomena: depressives show a relative facility in recalling unpleasant events
(Lishman, 1972; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975); this increased accessibility of
unpleasant memories has a diurnal variation (Clark & Teasdale, 1982); and
patients with mood swings show superior performance at memory tests if mood is
consistent between learning and recall than if the mood changes (Weingartner el al, 1977).
What mechanisms
underlie psychogenic amnesia? One possibility is that many instances of
psychogenic amnesia may result from faulty encoding of information at initial
input (Kopelman, 1985a) and that deficits in retrieval may arise in consequence
of this.
In support of
this view, it should be noted that psychogenic amnesia commonly occurs in
states of abnormal mood or extreme arousal, in which normal cognitive
processing might well be compromised. Fugues arise in the context of depressed
mood and severe stress; amnesia for offences in situations of extreme emotional
arousal, severe intoxication, or florid psychosis; and memory disorder in
depression in association with impaired attention and motivation. This view,
emphasising a disturbance in memory 'acquisition', suggests that the impairment
in psychogenic amnesia mimics that in organic amnesia-of which there is so
often an earlier history.
A second
possibility is, of course, that psychogenic amnesia is an example of 'motivated
forgetting' or repression. There is a considerable literature purporting to
test the 'repression hypothesis' by showing that subjects tend to recall
'pleasant' events more readily than 'unpleasant' (e.g. Meltzer, 1930) and that
this phenomenon cannot be accounted for by the relative affective intensity of
the memories (Master et al, 1983).
Although Freud (1915/17) wrote that "it is an undoubted fact that
disagreeable impressions are easily forgotten", this kind of experimental
study has often been criticised on the grounds that it fails to take account of
the role of 'antagonistic impulses' in engendering repression-"an attempt
at flight by the ego from libido which is felt as danger" (Freud,
1915/17). Experimental tests of repression in this sense tend to rely on very
crude laboratory analogues, but Erdelyi & Goldberg (1979) have reviewed a
number of concepts in contemporary cognitive psychology which appear to
resemble repression. In this connection, the recent observations in organic
amnesia of memory without awareness, and especially of preserved affective
reactions in the presence of profound amnesia, are particularly intriguing.
A third
possibility, strongly advocated by Bower (1981), is a (primary) retrieval
deficit. Bower suggested that the 'discrete' psychogenic amnesias may reflect
mood-state dependent phenomena, similar to those described in depression.
According to this view, the experiences of a 'dissociative state' would be
retrieved if the subject could be restored to the same subjective state in
which they originally occurred. Fugue states and amnesia for offences are both
associated with depressed mood and extreme states of arousal (Berrington et al, 1956; Taylor & Kopelman,
1984); and the latter are also associated with heavy abuse of alcohol in which
state dependent phenomena have commonly been described (Goodwin et al, 1969). Against this view, the
state-dependent phenomena seen in laboratory experiments tend to be small and
undramatic; mood disorder and alcohol abuse are common, whereas psychogenic
amnesia is rare; and the only direct test of the hypothesis has failed to
support it (Wolf, 1980).
Conclusion
This review has
attempted to summarise the clinical features and the pattern of the memory
dysfunction in selected examples of organic and psychogenic amnesia. It has
also surveyed various theories which purport to explain the nature of the
dysfunction.
It appears that
the anterograde amnesia produced by structural lesions, including the
widespread neuropathology of Alzheimer's disease, involves a severe impairment
in acquiring (or learning) new information, and any retrieval deficits arise
as a consequence of this. Contrary to clinical impression, the forgetting rate
of new information is not accelerated, once adequate learning has been
accomplished although elderly people do show somewhat poorer retention of
visuospatial material than younger subjects, and the metabolic disruption which
follows ECT may produce accelerated forgetting. The precise deficit in
psychological 'encoding' or physiological 'consolidation', which underlies this
acquisition (or learning) deficit, remains to be elucidated. However, the
simultaneous implication of two limbic circuits has been postulated as critical
for the occurrence of anterograde amnesia, and it is known that these pathways
contain cholinergic fibres.
Future research
is likely to clarify further the role of neurotransmitter depletion in
producing amnesia.
Both
psychological and pathophysiological evidence suggest the partial independence
of the retrograde and anterograde components of amnesia. Retrograde amnesia may
result from a number of factors, including a failure to make use of contextual
cues (with regard to time, order, place, and source) in 'reconstructing' past
experience. There is controversy as to where the critical lesions lie which
produce retrograde amnesia, but there is evidence that frontal lesions disrupt
the recall of contextual information. Moreover, two types of confabulation have
been postulated, one of which ('provoked') may be a normal response to poor
memory, but the other ('spontaneous') is characterised by the extremely
incoherent (context-free) retrieval of memories and associations, and appears
to reflect more extensive frontal pathology.
Finally, it has
been postulated that many instances of psychogenic amnesia may resemble organic
in that they result from the impaired acquisition of information at initial
input, perhaps thereby predisposing the subject to subsequent retrieval
difficulties.